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THE DECISION TO PLAY
The Decision to Play: College Football in the Era of COVID-1 9

Abstract
COVID-19 upended life around the world, including on college campuses across the U.S.
where institutions restructured their class modalities, campus life, extracurricular activities, and
intercollegiate athletics - including college football. We examine the factors that led universities
to make their decisions to play or not play college football during fall 2020, hypothesizing that
the decision to play would be consistent with the decision about class modality for health and
safety reasons, and that monetary and political motivations would also play a significant role.
We collected data for 249 institutions and used logistic regression techniques to test our
hypotheses. We ultimately found that health and safety concerns were not the driving factors in
the decision to play college football in the fall of 2020, but economics and politics were
statistically significant factors.

Keywords: College football, COVID-19, safety, economics, politics

Introduction
The world has changed drastically since December 2019 when COVJD-19 was
discovered in Wuhan, China (WHO, 2020). The first case of COVJD-19 in the United States was
reported in January 2020 and by March 13th, COVJD-19 was declared a national emergency for
the country. The World Health Organization officially named COVID-19 a pandemic on March
11th, 2020, and there were extensive shutdowns in the United States by the end of the month
(American Journal of Managed Care, 2020).
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These changes were acutely felt in the world of sport, as suddenly there were no live
sporting events. The National Basketball Association suspended their season on March 11th after
a single positive test and was the first national sporting organization in the United States to
postpone their season (Zillgitt, 2020). The National Hockey League announced a postponement
on March 12th (National Hockey League, 2020), the same day that Major League Soccer
announced a 30 day shut down (Reynolds, 2020). March 12th also saw Major League Baseball
announce the cancellation of spring training games and a two-week postponement to the start of
the season (Acquavella, Anderson, and Perry, 2020). Even beyond the world of professional
sports, there were massive ramifications at the collegiate level.
The NCAA March Madness basketball tournament is one of the biggest sporting
phenomena in the United States, and it also came to a screeching halt on March 12th. As
professional leagues began to shut down their seasons, individual c-onferences announced the
cancellation of their conference tournaments, and soon the NCAA had no choice but to follow
suit. This represented a massive financial blow to the organization, as the 2019 tournament
brought in a combined $933 million in total revenues (Caron, 2020). In the wake of the
cancellation of March Madness, there were immediate concerns about the future of college
football and those concerns came to fruition during summer 2020.
On July 8th, 2020, the Ivy League became the first Division I conference to cancel their
football season. In what was seen as an overreaction at the time, it would later prove to be an
intel ligent move, as they were followed by every other Football Championship Subdivision
(FCS) conference and several Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) conferences. This came after the
Ivy League was the first conference to cancel their basketball tournament on March I 0th, two
days prior to when most conferences would ultimately cancel.
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This paper will be centered around collegiate gridiron football in the United States, one
of the most popular sports in the country. The game is played with 11 p layers on each side, and
players have the opportunity to "touch, throw, and carry the ball with their hands" on alternating
possessions. The sport is considered a descendant of rugby and soccer and is "named for the
vertical yard lines marking the rectangular field" (Oriard, N.D.). Collegiate football refers to
gridiron football played by teams of student-athletes from universities, colleges, and military
academics.
The Football Champion Subdivision (FCS) is one of two halves o f Division I NCAA
football, formerly known as Division I-AA. Recognized as the " lower half' of Division I, the
FCS has been in existence since I978 and has gone by its current name since 2006. In total, there
are 13 conferences and 125 teams at the level. The hallmark of the FCS is how the national
champion is detennined: FCS teams play in a single-elimination bracket tournament, with a total
of24 teams currently participating in this annual process. To detennine participants in the
playoffs, IO of the conferences receive automatic playoff bids for the conference champion. The
remaining 14 spots in the playoff are "at-large" b ids. There is a Selection Committee that
chooses the teams to fill these "at-large" spaces, with the idea that they select the best teams in
the country who did not win their conference title (National Collegiate Athletic Association,
2020).
At the FCS level of football, every conterence in the country announced they would not
play a conference schedule in the fall. This started with the Ivy League's cancellation on July 8th
and ended with the Ohio Valley Conference shutting down fall football on August 14th, making
them the 13th and final conference at the FCS level to do so (Kelley, 2020). Several of these
conferences and individual teams decided that they would not play football until the fall of 2021,
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but 9 of the 13 FCS c-0nferences intend to play a season in the spring of2021 (Cbiusano, 2020).
However, many c-0nferences gave their teams the option to play non-conference games and a
total of 15 colleges played football in fall 2020 (Haley, 2020).
The Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) is the other half of Division I NCAA Football.
Considered the "upper half' of Division I, this subdivision was previously known as Division
I-A until 2006. There are IO FBS conferences and J 30 teams who compete at this level, whose
name is a reflection of the primary postseason activity of the level. While there is a College
football Playoff at the FBS level, it only includes the four highest-ranking teams in the country.
T he majority of successful teams will participate in a postseason bowl game, of which there were
40 in 2019. Bowl games are single games between teams of different conferences, typically
presented by a corporate sponsor. Beyond the different format and a higher level of competition,
FBS schools arc required to sponsor more athletic teams but they are given a higher number of
scholarships to be divided amongst their roster ( Weinrib, 2020).
At the FBS level of football, several teams outright canceled their seas-0ns and the
Southeastern Conference canceled its non-conference schedule on July 30, 2020 (Wilmer, 2020).
Perhaps more notably, there were four conferences that originally cancelled their entire seasons.
The Mid-American C-Ooference (MAC) was the first FBS conference to outright cancel their
season, with their announcement coming on August 8th. T hey announced a scheduled return to
play on September 25th, with the first game being played on November 4th (Reyes, 2020). The
Mountain West Conference followed the MAC on August I 0th, announcing an October 24th
return to play on September 25th (Mountain West, 2020). On August 11th, the Big Ten canceled
their season but announced reinstatement of their season on September 16th, with play resuming
on October 24th (Rittenberg and Dinich, 2020). T he Pacific Twelve C-Onference also announced
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a season cancellation on August 11th, later announcing they would resume play on November
6th in a September 24th media release (Pac-12 Conference, 2020).
The objective of this study is to examine the factors that may have led to the decision to
play or not play football during the era ofCOVID-19. Utilizing data about the status of fall
semester classes at each university, the football-specific revenues of each school, and the
political leanings of the region, this paper seeks to establish relationships between the
aforementioned factors and the decision to play for collegiate football programs at both the FBS
and FCS level.

Hypotheses

Sports during the era ofCOVID-19 remain a largely unexplored field, as there simply has
not been the time for adequate research to be completed on the subject. This study aims to solve
that issue in part, providing an examination of the institutional factors that may have been related
to the decision made by each university to play or not play college football this fall.
The pandemic has created a new age of online learning, with 1.2 billion children around
the globe experiencing education in a remote capacity (Li and Lalani, 2020). This has also been
seen on college campuses, where a mere 4% of universities are fully in-person. 27% of colleges
have been reported as at least primarily in person, and a whopping 44% have been reported as
being entirely ooline or primarily online. This ra.ises an obvious question: are universities
consistent in their approaches towards the COVlD-19 pandemic? If a college is fully online but
still playing football, what message does that convey about the regard for the safety of those
student-athletes?
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Schools like Notre Dame, North Carolina, and North Carolina State had to at least pause
in-person classes due to COVID-19 outbreaks on campus, but there were never any reports that
the football program at each respective school was in danger of shutting down. As pointed out by
Dennis Dodd of CBS Sports, "None of this impacts football directly. Rather, it is creating
increasingly bad optics." It is a bad look for universities who play football without students on
campus, and conference commissioners have even previously stated that there would be no
football without students on campus. The obvious workaround is a "hybrid" model, in which
universities have a portion of their classes as in-person and an additional portion as online
(Dodd, 2020). Some of the largest and most prevalent universities to utilize an online model
include Ohio State University, the University of Tex.as at Austin, and PeMsylvania State
University. (Chronicle of Higher Education, 2020).
The reversal of decisions to not play also bears significant scrutiny, such as the choice of
the Big Ten to play football despite an early decision that they would play in 2021 at the earliest.
Conference leaders "insisted that they bad reconsidered because of, not in spite of, medical
advice." (Blinder, 2020). This led to the unanimous decision to play football in the fall of 2020,
but there still were many questions about the factors that truly influenced the decision. Was there
political interference? Was the appeal of a sizable media contract too much to ignore? Or did
seeing other conferences play without repercussions makes it simply too enticing of an option for
the athletic directors and administrators to ignore?
Conversely, what does it say if classes are fully in-person and the university has opted out
of competing in fall sports? New Mexico State U niversity is among the independent institutions
that opted out of playing football this fall, but they pursued a hybrid educational model with
some students in classrooms. We can also use teams in the Mid-American Conference as an
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interesting case study for this question. Despite being the first FBS conference to cancel their
scheduled season, Ball State University, University of Toledo, and Western Michigan University
still pursued primarily in-person education during the fall. Additionally, Bowling Green State
University, University of Buffalo, and Central Michigan University pursued a hybrid educational
model . Th is means that half of the teams in the conference were planning to have at least a
portion of the student body in the classroom, yet they were not originally planning to put
together a fall football season.
Overall, the set of circumstances surrounding higher education and COVID-19 have
raised a lot of significant questions about the safety of playing college football during the fall of
2020. Many of the institutions choosing not to play football also opted to keep classes in an
online format. Many more schools chose to play football and also had their entire student body
on campus, which presents clear logical reasoning. If an institution feels it is safe enough to have
students in classrooms, they likely also feel comfortable with the play of collegiate sports.
Using data from the Chronicle of Higher Education, we seek to check the strength of this logical
relationship. These ideas about logical consistency in the era of COVID-19 suggest the following
hypothesis:

Hypothesis I: Universities with primarily in-person classes are more likely to play
college football games during the era of COVJD-19.

Another important consideration is the financial element associated with playing college
football. Since football is typically viewed as the single largest revenue driver for an athletic
department, it is only logical that schools will want to play football if they will profit from it.
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This can be examined by comparing the football-specific revenues of Power Five schools, Group
of Five schools, and FCS schools. Revenues at FBS schools can be quite lucrative, with the
University of Texas at Austin bringing in a whopping $156 million in revenue during the
2018-2019 fiscal year (Barnett, 2020). Even on the low end of revenues, West Virginia
University represented the lowest-grossing Power Five football program with a total of$25
million. At Group of Five schools, revenues ranged from $30 million (University of Central
Florida) to a comparatively small $5 million at the University of Louisiana-Monroe.
We have previously explained the difference between FBS and FCS, so we will now use
this space to explain the difference between Power Five and Group of Five schools. "The Power
Five refers to five conferences considered the elite of collegiate football" (British Broadcasting
Corporation, 2020). These are regarded as the five most competitive conferences in NCAA
Division I football: the Atlantic Coast Conference, the Big Ten Conference, the Big Twelve
Conference, the Pacific-Twelve Conference, and the Southeastern Conference. Group of Five
represents the five remaining conferences at the FBS level, and the level of competition is
considered lower than the Power Five but higher than the FCS. T he five conferences are the
American Athletic Conference, Conference USA, the Mid-American Conference, the Mountain
West Conference, and the Sun Belt Conference.
Based on the numbers, football represents a major revenue driver. Per USA Today Sports,
the University of Texas at Austin brought in nearly $224 million in total athletic department
revenue during the 2018-2019 fiscal year. This means that almost 70% of the revenue was tied to
a single sport - football. Another point of interest is the decision by Conference-USA to only
play football during the fall of 2020. Is football an inherently safer sport in the midst of a
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pandemic? Or is it simply because football represents an influx of cash for each athletic
department?
Using data from the U.S. Department of Education's Equity in Athletics Data Analysis,
we will be able to see bow football-specific expenses likely played into the decision to play
college football during fall 2020. Based on these ideas, the following hypothesis can be
suggested:

Hypothesis 2: Universities with higher football-specific expenses will be more like(v to
play college football games during the era ofCOVID-19.

Politics have also played a significant role in the handling of COVID-19 throughout T he
United States. In a study by the Pew Research Center, it was found that "Republicans remain far
less likely than Democrats to view COV[D-19 as a major threat to public health" (Tyson, 2020).
Data like this indicates that Democratic politicians would likely place more severe restrictions
regarding COVID-19, while their Republican counterparts would be comparatively lax in their
policies for the pandemic. As such, it can reasonably be expected that universities in these
regions would be under similar political influences, likely helping to determine the school's
course of action for the fall 2020 collegiate football season.

Hypothesis 3: Universities in Republican-lea11i11g areas will be more like(v to play college
football games during the era ofCOVID- 19.

Methods
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To test the hypotheses we developed, we decided to utilize a logistic regression

model

in which the dependent variable is classified as either a I or 0. In this case, I represented that the
instinnion's football team played at least one game during fall 2020. Some FCS schools played
only a single game or just a few games, but any team playing at least once during fall 2020 was
listed as a I. AO represents teams that did not play during fall 2020. This includes teams that
decided to play in spring 2021 and those that completely canceled football for the 2020-2021
academic year.
For the data regarding reopening models for each college, we collected data from The
Chronicle of Higher Education's article ''Here's Our List of Colleges' Reopening Models''. They
classified each school's reopening model as being "fully in person", "primarily in person",
"hybrid'', "primarily online", "fully online", "other", and "undetermined". For the purposes of
use in our study, we used a simple dichotomy - l if classes were "fully in person" or "primarily
in-person" and 0 if classes did not fit into those two categories. This information was informed
by the work of the College Crisis Initiative at Davidson College. We reached out to Davidson
regarding the oppornmity to use their primary data set and they agreed to share the information,
but they ultimately never sent the data. As a result, we moved forward using the data from The
Chronicle of Higher Education.
For the data regarding football-specific finances, we relied on the "Equity in Athletics
Data Analysis" provided by the United States Department of Education. We chose to use
expenses as our financial variable due to "accounting games" that are typically played at the
institutional level. Many universities and colleges manipulate their football-specific revenues so
that the net revenues come out to $0 or -$1, meaning that expenses would be a more accurate
measure of the fmancial dimension of our model.
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For the data regarding politics, we took the political party of each state's governor from
the National Governors Association's governors listing. We also looked al the results from
National Public Radio ·s "2020 Election Results" 10 determine tbe winning candidate for each
candidate, as well as the percentage of1ha1 county's vote that went to Joseph Biden. The political
party of the governor provided the strongest correlation in our preliminary data tests aod we
chose to use that as our political variable for our models. In this case, Democratic governors
were assigned a value of I and Republican governors were assigned a value of 0.
We also chose to utilize several control variables in our model and bad logical reasons for
choosing each of them. The first control variable we used was the net price of attendance at each
institution, listed in thousands of U.S. dollars. We chose 10 include this variable witb the idea in
mind that the greater the net price of attendance, the less likely the college would be seeking to
play because the influx of capital from the student body would lessen the financial pressures of
athletics.
From the same source (National Center for Education Statistics), we also collected data
regarding what percentage of the university's student body is student-athletes. This variable was
chosen based on the concept that the greater the percentage of the student body as
student-athletes, the more likely the university was to play football.
The next control variable we used was the university 's endowment, listed in billions of
U.S. dollars. This data was provided by the National Association of College and University
Business Officers, and was included based on the concept that the greater the endowment, the
less likely the institution was to play football due to reduced financial pressures.
The final control variable used was winning percentage in 2019. Since a team with recent
success would be expected to continue that success in 2020, it makes logical sense that teams
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with recent success would be more likely to want to play. As such, we theorized that the greater
the team's win percentage in 2019, the more likely they were to play football during fall 2020.

Res ults
Table 2 displays the results of each model we ran for this study. Model I served as the
control and was an opportunity to create baselines for the control variables in our sample. Model
2 is regarding the status of classes as it relates to the decision to play in fall 2020. Based on the
coefficient of 0.454, we know the relationship between the decision to play and the status of
classes is such that institutions with at least primarily io-person classes were more likely to play
football during fall 2020. However, with a P-value of 0.219, we know that a statistically
significant relationship does not exist between the status of classes and the decision to play.
Model 3 displays the results of our model regarding the financial impact on the decision
to play. With a coefficient of0.600, there is a positive relationship between expenses and the
decision to play. In this case, it means that the greater the expenses of the football program, the
more likely they were to play football during fall 2020. Since the P-value is 0.000, we know that
there is a very strong statistically significant relationship present and that football expenses were
extremely relevant in the decision to play.
Model 4 displays the results of our political model, based on the political party of the
state's governor. The coefficient of -0.714 indicates that if the state 's governor was a Democrat,
the university's football program was less likely to play. The model produced a P value of 0.025,
representing another statistically significant relationship regarding the decision to play.
Model 5 displays a combined model with all three variables included. The purpose of
combining the models is to observe how the variables interact because there is the possibility that
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the combination of variables may cancel each other out. The status of classes continued to be
non-statistically significant with a P-value of 0.316, while football-specific expenses and the
political party of the state's governor remained statistically significant at 0.000 and 0.024
respectively. Model 6 features the final "best model" that we produced, containing the financial
and political variables. Expenses remained statistically significant at 0.000 and the governor's
party proved to be slightly more significant than before with a value of 0.020.

Discussion and Conclusion
The results that were produced by our models help us make several significant
conclusions regarding the decision to play college football in fall 2020. The first conclusion is
that safety was not a statistically significant factor influencing the decision to play. T his does not
mean that safety was not a consideration at any institutions, but it was simply not a consideration
at enough institutions to be statistically significant. We simply didn't see the logical consistency
we bad expected: that institutions with primarily in-person classes would play and that
institutions with primarily online classes would not play.
The second conclusion we can make is that football-specific expenses were a major
consideration that influenced the decision to play. Due to all the sunk costs associated with
college football (coaching staff salaries, facilities, player scholarships, and miscellaneous costs),
it's reasonable to assume that these programs are eager to recoup the costs associated with their
football program, since the expenses associated with the season itself typically makes up a very
small percentage of the team's overall expenses.
The final conclusion that can be made is that there was indeed political influence
regarding the decision to play. This can be attributed to the regional political response to
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COVID-19, which we expected when originally coming up with hypotheses. The politics of each
state and region likely influenced the response at each institution, which in tum influenced the
decision to play.
There were unfortunately a few shortcomings to our study, the first being that we did not
have access to the data set from Davidson College. Access to such data would have allowed us to
make more accurate conclusions regarding the decision to play as it interacts with the modality
of classes. The other major shortcoming we faced was the quality of the financial data we were
able to access. Due to the "accounting games" that are typically played at the institutional level,
we did not have a truly accurate data set, especially in tem1s of net revenues.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation.s
Variuble

I. Fall Games
2. Face-to-Face
Classes
3. Football
Expenses
4. Governor's
Political Pany
5. Net Price of
Attendance
6. % of Student-

Athktes
7. Endowment
8. Win% Prior
Season
N =249

Mc,in

s.d.

Min

Max

I

0.566

0.497

0.000

1.000

1.000

0.273

0.446

0.000

1.000

0.009

1.000

13.921

13.957

1.060

69.720

0.605'

-0.004

1.000

0.478

0.501

(1.(1()()

1.000

-0. 152'

-0.08 I

-0.090

1.000

18.798

7.501

6.(1()0

43.110

-0. 179°

0.094

0.044

0.148'

I.I)()()

0.061

0.056

0.010

0330

-0.492°

0.062

-0.37J'

0.114

0.435°

1.000

1.663

4.663

0.001.1

3$.300

0.031

-0.120

o.2os•

(1.069

0.(168

0.138·

l.(~N)

0.499

0.21 5

0.(KIO

1.000

0.124

-0.017

0.24~•

-0.575

0.(JI 2

-0. 1()5

0.()'/7

•coetlicicnts are significant at lhe .05 level

2

J

4

5

6

7

8

J.000
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Table 2: Logistic Regression Models

Variable
Face-to-Face Classes

l

2

3

0.454
(0.219)

(0.316)

Endowment
Win% Prior Season
Constant

LRchi2 ,

t~!i!,"-2 B. .

N=249

6

0.600

0.642

0.638

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.714

-I.IO I

-1.134

(0.025)

(0.024)

(0.020)

Governor's Political Party

% ofStudenl-Athletes

s
0.504

Football Expenses

Net Price of Attendance

4

0.033

0.032

-0.091

0.038

-0.091

-0.088

(0.173)

(0.188)

(0.039)

(0.119)

(0.057)

(0.062)

-41.004

-41.870

-2.634

-41.675

-2.739

-2.461

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.654)

(0.000)

(0.666)

(0.695)

0.110

0 .116

-0.306

0. 118

-0.255

-0.252

(0.004)

(0.003)

(0.361)

(0.003)

(0.548)

(0.553)

0.590

0.545

0. 181

0.564

0.042

0.063

(0.422)

(0.458)

(0.873)

(0.453)

(0.971)

(0.956)

1.392

l.347

-2.314

1.678

-2.1 82

-2.070

(0.014)

(0.017)

(0.022)

(0.005)

(0.038)

(0.044)

90.500

92.050

208.840

95.630

215.740

214.740

0.266

0.270

0.613

0.281

0.633

0.630

